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While there is accumulating evidence for the existence of distinct neural systems supporting goal-directed and habitual action selection
in the mammalian brain, much less is known about the nature of the information being processed in these different brain regions.
Associative learning theory predicts that brain systems involved in habitual control, such as the dorsolateral striatum, should contain
stimulus and response information only, but not outcome information, while regions involved in goal-directed action, such as ventro-
medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and dorsomedial striatum, should be involved in processing information about outcomes as
well as stimuli and responses. To test this prediction, human participants underwent fMRI while engaging in a binary choice task
designed to enable the separate identification of these different representations with a multivariate classification analysis approach.
Consistent with our predictions, the dorsolateral striatum contained information about responses but not outcomes at the time of an
initial stimulus, while the regions implicated in goal-directed action selection contained information about both responses and out-
comes. These findings suggest that differential contributions of these regions to habitual and goal-directed behavioral control may
depend in part on basic differences in the type of information that these regions have access to at the time of decision making.
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Introduction
Two distinct strategies support behavioral control: a goal-
directed strategy that flexibly generates decisions based on delib-
erate evaluation of the consequences of actions and a habitual
strategy relying on a reflexive, automatic elicitation of actions
(Dickinson, 1985; Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Balleine et al.,
2008). These distinct mechanisms depend on at least partly dis-
sociable brain systems, with the posterior dorsolateral striatum
(DLS) implicated in habits (Yin et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2009)
and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) or its rodent
homolog, and the dorsomedial striatum (DMS), contributing to
goal-directed control (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Killcross
and Coutureau, 2003; Yin et al., 2005; Tanaka et al., 2008). How-
ever, the nature of the information encoding in these regions is
much less understood.
According to associative learning theory, in habits, associa-
tions are formed between stimuli (S) and responses (R), without
any encoding of the goal or outcome (O). In contrast, in goal-
directed learning, associations are formed between stimuli, re-
sponses, and outcomes (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998).
Specifically, goal representations are suggested to be elicited via
S-O associations, which in turn retrieve response representations
via an O-R association (Balleine and Ostlund, 2007; de Wit and
Dickinson, 2009).
Several neurophysiology studies have explored whether brain
regions implicated in habitual and goal-directed action contain
different types of information. Most of those studies have re-
ported similar information encoding in bothDMS andDLS (Kim
et al., 2009, 2013; Kimchi et al., 2009; Stalnaker et al., 2010),
although one study did find a change in the level of activity in
DMS and DLS as animals transitioned from goal-directed to ha-
bitual control (Gremel and Costa, 2013). Another approach has
been to correlate computational learningmodels to fMRI or neu-
rophysiology data (O’Doherty et al., 2003; Samejima et al., 2005).
Some studies found different types of reinforcement learning
(model free vs model based) correlate with activity in DLS com-
pared with DMS, vmPFC, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(dlPFC; Hampton et al., 2006; Gla¨scher et al., 2010; Wunderlich
et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2014) while others report more mixed
representations (Daw et al., 2011; Simon and Daw, 2011). How-
ever, while such analyses reveal the computations that might be
operating in a given area, they do not illuminate the type of in-
formation encoded in those regions upon which a particular
computational process may act.
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In the present study, human participants underwent fMRI
while performing a binary decision task, in which we carefully
manipulated response and outcome identity across experimental
sessions. Using a multivariate pattern analysis, we tested for the
presence of response and outcome information at the time of
stimulus and action performance in different brain regions. We
hypothesized that brain regions implicated in habitual control,
suchas theDLS,would encode response, butnotoutcome, informa-
tion indicating a role for this region in supporting stimulus–
response associations, while other brain regions such as the
vmPFC, dlPFC, and anterior DMS would contain representa-
tions of both responses and outcomes, indicative of a role for
those regions in goal-directed learning and control.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Nineteen healthy, right-handed volunteers participated in this study (11
male; mean age 22.9; SD 4.1 years). The volunteers were pre-assessed to
exclude those with a history of neurological or psychiatric illness. All
participants gave informed consent and the study was approved by the
Institutional Review Board of the California Institute of Technology.
Task
Participants performed a simple binary decision task (Fig. 1A). At the
start of each trial an initial stimulus environment was indicated by one of
two Sanskrit characters. The participant then performed one of two pos-
sible actions and subsequently entered an outcome state in which they
received an associated reward. Therewere two distinct initial stimuli, two
possible outcome states (represented by a blue circle and a red square,
respectively), and two reward distributions: high (equal probability of $8,
$10, and $12) and low (equal probability of $2, $4, and $6). Participants
interacted with the environment using two qualitatively different ac-
tions: a double button press and a trackball roll. These actions were
performed on the same device using the right hand. Action outcomes
were anticorrelated and deterministic such that, within a session, a par-
ticular action always led to a given outcome, and that outcome always
yielded a particular reward distribution. The
initial stimulus determined the subsequent
action-outcome contingencies and thus indi-
cated which of the two actions was highly re-
warded on a given trial.
Critically, the relationships between initial
stimuli, actions, outcomes, and reward distribu-
tions were permuted across four conditions, en-
suring that representations of one decision
variable (e.g., actions) could not be confounded
with those of another (e.g., initial stimuli;  cor-
relation coefficient 0.005 for all pairs of vari-
ables). Thus, if in one condition, the button press
produced the blue circle followed by a high re-
ward, in another condition the tracker ball pro-
duced the blue circle followed by a high reward,
and so on. Since, across the four conditions, each
decision variable was paired equally often with
each level of every other decision variable, and
since subsequent classification was performed
across conditions, these permutations ensure
that each decision variable is dissociated from all
others. A description of the full set of permuta-
tions is provided inTable 1. The order of the four
conditions was counterbalanced across subjects.
At the beginning of the experiment, before
any scanning, participants were given detailed
instructions about the task procedure and trial
structure. Specifically, they were told that each
trial would begin with the presentation of an
abstract symbol, which would be followed by a
brief “wait” pause, in turn followed by a
prompt to respond, using either of the two ac-
tions, another wait pause, a picture of a colored shape and, finally, the
reward delivered on that trial. The wait pauses, shown in Figure 1, were
included to ensure the separation of intertrial events. Participants were
further instructed that the relationships between initial stimuli, actions, out-
comes, and rewardswould change throughout the task, and that theywould
be notifiedwhenever those changes occurred. Each scanning condition con-
sisted of three consecutive sessions separated by 2min breaks during which
the scanner was turned off (to reduce inter-run variability in image inten-
sity), with 16 instrumental choice trials per session (eight for each initial
stimulus, randomly interleaved). At the beginning of each session, partici-
pants were instructed either that the relationships between initial stimuli,
actions, outcomes, and rewards would be the same in the upcoming session
as in the previous (within condition) or that these relationships had changed
and would have to be relearned (between conditions). Finally, participants
were told to use their knowledge of instrumental contingencies tomaximize
their monetary gain. Due to the simple nature of the task, participants rap-
idly achieved a high level of performance in each condition, selecting the
action that yielded the high reward distribution on the vastmajority of trials
(see Results).
fMRI data acquisition
Functional imaging was performed with a 3 T Siemens Trio scanner.
Forty-five contiguous interleaved transversal slices of echo-planar T2*-
weighted images were acquired in each volume, with a slice thickness of 3
mm and no gap (repetition time, 2650 ms; echo time, 30 ms; flip angle,
90°; field of view, 192mm2; matrix, 64 64). Slice orientation was tilted
30° from a line connecting the anterior and posterior commissure. This
slice tilt alleviates the signal drop in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC;
Deichmann et al., 2003). We discarded the first three images before data
processing and statistical analysis to compensate for the T1 saturation
effects. A whole-brain, high-resolution T1-weighted structural scan
(voxel size: 1 1 1 mm3) was also acquired for each subject.
Data preprocessing and filtering
Slice timing correction, motion correction, and spatial normalization
were applied to the data. Before multivoxel sample extraction, low-
A
B
Figure 1. Task design and time-span decoding.A, Subjects performed a binary decision task. One of two possible initial stimuli
(STIMULUS)was presented,which determined the subsequent deterministic action-outcome contingencies between twopossible
actions and two possible outcome states. Outcome states were denoted by either a blue circle or a red square and were followed,
after a short delay, by one of two distributions of monetary rewards (large or small). Crucially, each possible combination of
stimulus, action, and outcome was permuted across conditions, thereby ensuring that representations of these different decision
variables were not conflated (see Material and Methods). B, These analyses aimed to assess the classification of events that were
being associatively retrieved by the initial stimulus. The classifier was trained on the relevant events (e.g., actions) at the time of
their execution, but tested on those same events at the time of the initial stimulus (see Materials and Methods for more details).
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frequency components (1/120 Hz), serial autocorrelations, and head
motion were subtracted from the data. To correct for session-related
mean and scaling effects, we applied second-order detrending and z scor-
ing on a per voxel per session basis (Pereira et al., 2009). Preprocessing
and filtering were performed using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.
uk/spm/), except detrending and z scoring for which the PyMVPA pack-
age was used (Hanke et al., 2009).
General linear model
Eight regressors of interest were included in the general linear model
(GLM). Each regressor corresponded to the identity of a particular deci-
sion variable (i.e., one regressor for each initial stimulus, each action,
each outcome, and each reward distribution). In addition, parametric
modulators reflecting the actual reward delivered on a given trial were
added to the reward-distribution regressors. Time series of head motion
estimated during realignment were included as covariates of no interest.
Classification algorithm
We used a Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB) classification algorithm (Mitchell,
1997) with an assumption of zero covariance across voxels. To perform
binary classification our algorithm first estimatesmean activity vectors and
covariance matrices from training data for the Gaussian distributions
p(xA) and p(xB). Then, the algorithm assigns a test sample xtest to the
condition with the maximum posterior probability at xtest based on the
estimated distributions: if p(xtestA) p(xtestB) the algorithm infers that
xtest was sampled under condition A. Generalization accuracy is esti-
mated using cross-validation. This involves training and testing on mu-
tually exclusive subsets of samples and repeating with a different
partitioning on each “fold.” Cross-validation was done on a leave-one-
session-out basis. On every fold, the classifier was trained on three
sessions and tested on the remaining session, thereby avoiding session-
related dependencies between training and testing samples (Mitchell,
1997; Kriegeskorte et al., 2009; Pereira et al., 2009). Accuracy scores were
averaged to give the generalization accuracy. All preprocessing and filter-
ingwas performed on a per session basis. Importantly, the average Spear-
man correlation between combinations of decision variables across
subjects was 2 105, 1 103, and 2 104, respectively, indicating
that the classifier could not erroneously decode one decision variable
based on correlated representations of another.
Multivariate pattern analysis
A searchlight procedure (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Kahnt et al., 2010)
provided a spatially unbiased estimator of distributed activity across the
brain. This involved the performance of GNB classification on the fMRI
data in spheres of voxels of radius 3 throughout the brain. We extracted
a sample of fMRI data corresponding to the initial stimulus, action, and
outcome time points in each trial (with a shift of 5 s to account for
hemodynamic delay) by averaging the two volumes closest in time (one
before and one after) to the relevant time point (Clithero et al., 2011;
McNamee et al., 2013). Each fMRI data sample had two task-related
characteristics: time point and identity. Our hypotheses required us to
decode based on a variety of interactions between these two characteris-
tics, which we detail below. In particular, we performed the following
analyses to determine whether neural representations of decision vari-
ables are present at time points in a trial other than the moment of
perception or action. For all analyses below, cross-fold validation was
used, inwhich trainingwas done on the data from11 sessions, and testing
was done on the data from the 12th session. This was then repeated 12
times, using a different test session on each occasion.
Time-span decoding
In “time-span” decoding analyses, we trained the classifier at one time
point in the trial to discriminate activity patterns elicited at another time
point in the trial (Fig. 1B).
Action at stimulus time. To detect regions involved in encoding action
representations at the time of initial stimulus presentation, we trained
our classifier to discriminate between different action representations
(double button press vs trackerball roll) at the time of action selection.
We then tested the classifier at the time of initial stimulus presentation to
assess whether activity in a given brain area during the time of initial
stimulus presentation reflected the action that would subsequently be
selected on that trial. A successful classification in a given brain region
would indicate that information about the to-be-performed action is
represented during the initial decision period, suggesting the presence of
stimulus–response associations in that region.
Outcome at stimulus time. To detect regions involved in encoding out-
come representations at the time of initial stimulus presentation in the
trial, we trained our classifier to discriminate different target outcomes,
e.g., blue circle versus red square as they were presented at the time of
outcome delivery. We then tested the classifier at the time of initial stim-
ulus presentation (i.e., at the onset of the trial) to assess whether activity
in a given brain area during the time of initial stimulus presentation
reflected the outcome that would ultimately be delivered on that trial
(contingent on the subsequent action). A successful classification in a
given brain area would indicate that information about the goal of an
action is represented in that area during the initial decision period.
Decoding of integrated representations
We were also interested in testing for “integrated representations,” in
which distinct combinations of stimuli and actions (e.g., S1-A1 and S2-
A2) might be encoded as unique configurations (S1-A1 vs S2-A2), as
opposed to encoded as elemental action representations (A1 vs A2). The
key distinction is that an integrated representation of an S1-A1 combi-
nation would successfully decode only on trials in which A1 is selected in
the presence of S1 but not otherwise; in contrast, a unitary representation
of action A1 would successfully decode on any trial in which A1 was
selected, regardless of whether S1 or S2 was present. To detect such
integrated representations we performed the following steps.
Stage 1: Establishing potential regions of interest (ROIs). First we trained
the classifier to decode S1-A1 versus S2-A2 configurations at the time of
initial stimulus presentation and tested for those representations at the
same time point. A significant signal in this analysis is indicative of the
encoding of unitary stimulus representations, unitary action representa-
tions, or integrated stimulus-action representations.
Stage 2: Ruling out unitary stimulus representation. Second, we used the
classifier weights trained up in stage 1 to also test for discrimination
between S1-A2 versus S2-A1. If the classifier performs significantly above
chance, this would indicate that unitary stimulus information is being
decoded (since the only consistent labels between the training and testing
data are S1 and S2).
Stage 3: Ruling out unitary action representation. In our third analysis,
we again used the classifier weights from stage 1, and tested if the
classifier could decode S2-A1 versus S1-A2. Similar logic implies that
significant decoding in this analysis is consistent with unitary action
representations.
It is also possible that both integrated and unitary representations are
present in a region simultaneously. Significant classification in stage 1
Table 1. Illustration of the experimental conditions describing the permutation
across sessions
Condition Stimulus Action Outcome Reward
1 S1 A1 Red High
S1 A2 Blue Low
S2 A1 Red Low
S2 A2 Blue High
2 S1 A1 Blue Low
S1 A2 Red High
S2 A1 Blue High
S2 A2 Red Low
3 S1 A1 Blue High
S1 A2 Red Low
S2 A1 Blue Low
S2 A2 Red High
4 S1 A1 Red Low
S1 A2 Blue High
S2 A1 Red High
S2 A2 Blue Low
S1, S2, stimuli; A1, A2, button press and trackerball actions. Note that the order of presentation of the experimental
conditions was also permuted across participants.
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but not in stages 2 and 3 is indicative of integrated stimulus-action rep-
resentations only. Thus, to attribute decoding signals specifically to inte-
grated representations, we consider the conjunction between two
statistical maps obtained from per voxel paired t tests between (1) accu-
racy scores in stage 1 versus stage 2 and (2) accuracy scores in stage 1
versus stage 3. The only explanation for a signal that survives this strin-
gent criterion is that it is generated by an integrated stimulus-action
representation, since the first paired t test rules out stimulus-only decod-
ing and the second rules out action-only decoding.
Significance testing
For the searchlight analyses, the percentage of correctly identified sam-
ples, averaged across folds in the cross-validation, was used as the classi-
fication score in each searchlight and this score was assigned to the voxel
at the center of the searchlight sphere. This defined a classification accu-
racy map for each subject, which was then smoothed with an 8 mm
FWHM kernel. A second-level analysis was implemented by performing
voxelwise t tests comparing the distribution of accuracies across partici-
pants against 50%, which is the expected performance of an algorithm
randomly labeling samples. Since multivariate classification is suscepti-
ble to optimistic classification biases, we performed permutation tests to
validate our decoding procedure (McNamee et al., 2013).
All results were significant at familywise error rate (FWE)-adjusted
p 0.05 corrected formultiple comparisons by controlling the FWEwith
a 10 voxel extent threshold. We had strong prior hypotheses regarding
action and outcome representations in posterolateral and anteromedial
striatum, and in ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Thus,
in these areas, corrections were performed within small volumes de-
fined a priori based on relevant functional imaging studies (see Table
2). Small volume corrections are denoted throughout by SVFWE and
whole-brain corrections by FWE. For display purposes, we present
overlays thresholded at p  0.005 uncorrected.
Psychophysiological interactions. Blood-oxygen-level dependent
(BOLD) time courses were extracted from ROIs using SPM’s Volume of
Interest functionality correcting for an F-contrast composed of all effects
of interest in the GLM. ROIs were defined as the set of voxels within a 6
mm radius of seed coordinates, which were independently defined based
on related functional imaging studies (see Table 2). A GLM was then
constructed with three regressors in the following order: the BOLD time
course from the seed region (the physiological term), an indicator regres-
sor encoding the initial stimulus onset on each trial (the psychological
term), and the corresponding interaction regressor. Once theGLMswere
estimated for all participants, a second-level contrast (i.e., across partic-
ipants) was specified for the interaction regressor. The resulting statisti-
cal map details the degree of coupling, modulated by the psychological
regressor, between the seed region and voxels throughout the brain. It
does this by measuring howmuch BOLD activity in the target location is
accounted for by the interaction term in the GLM.
Results
Behavioral performance
Due to the relatively simple nature of the task, and the training
conducted before each experimental condition, participants were
expected to perform close to optimally (defined as choosing ac-
tions associated with the high reward distribution in each condi-
tion). To assess the acquisition of instrumental contingencies, we
divided the three sessions making up each condition into 12 bins
of four trials and computed the percentage of “correct” (i.e., op-
timal) responses in each bin, averaging across conditions. As can
be seen in Figure 2A, participants quickly reached asymptotic
performance; on average achieving and maintaining90% correct
responding by the beginning of the second session. When all trials
were considered, the mean percentage of optimal action selection
was 90%. Performance ranged from 85.4 to 97.4%, except in one
participant who was an outlier in terms of having a performance
level of 60.1%.The individualwith theoutlier performance levelwas
nonetheless included in the fMRI analysis, as a sufficient number
of trials were still available for the classification performance. A
condition(4)-by-bin(12) repeated-measures ANOVA performed
on the percentage correct scores yielded a significant effect of
training (p 0.001), but no effect of condition (p 0.99) and no
condition-by-bin interaction (p  0.16). Pairwise comparisons
of bin scores, averaged across conditions, revealed significant dif-
ferences between the first and all subsequent bins (all ps 0.01),
as well as between the second bin and bins 6 through 12 (all ps
0.05). Furthermore, the third and fourth bins both differed sig-
nificantly from bins 6 and 9 through 12 (all ps  0.05) and sig-
nificant differences were also found between bin 7 and 11, as well
as between bin 8 and 10 and 11 (all ps  0.05). In contrast,
response times (shown in Fig. 2B) were relatively constant across
bins, with an analogous ANOVA yielding no main effects or in-
teractions (smallest p 0.48).
Neuroimaging results
Goal-directed associative encoding
We first tested for areas surviving individual tests for outcome
information or action information during the initial stimulus
period, and then finally report a conjunction across those tests,
which is the key criterion for a region involved in goal-directed
associative encoding (Balleine and Ostlund, 2007).
Outcome at stimulus time
We first tested for brain regions involved in encoding outcome
identity at the time of the initial stimulus, as such representations
would be indicative of regions having access to the goal or out-
come at the time of decision making. We used a time-span anal-
ysis to train the classifier on outcome representations at the time
Table 2. ROIs
Region Coordinates Source
dlPFC (48, 9, 36) (Gläscher et al., 2010)
vmPFC (3, 41,11) (McNamee et al., 2013)
cOFC (21, 38,11) (McNamee et al., 2013)
Caudate (anterior) (6, 10, 20) (Tanaka et al., 2008)
Putamen/GP (posterior) (33,24, 0) (Tricomi et al., 2009)
Hippocampus (18,6,20) (34,14,18) (Simon and Daw, 2011)
PPI analysis only
Thalamus WFU PickAtlas mask (Maldjian et al., 2003)
Motor cortex WFU PickAtlas mask (Maldjian et al., 2003)
Correction was performed within a 10 mm radius sphere surrounding the corresponding coordinates.
A
B
Figure 2. Behavior. A, Choice accuracy. B, Response times across training (Session 1) and
experimental sessions. Each time bin represents four trials, and each data point is averaged
across conditions and participants.
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of outcomedelivery, and tested at the time
of stimulus presentation. Prospective rep-
resentations of the predicted outcome
state at the time of stimulus were identi-
fied in right dlPFC (p 0.05 SVFWE, t(18)
 4.55, x  60, y  20, z  34) and in
central OFC (p  0.05 SVFWE, t(18) 
3.11, x 18, y 32, z20).
Outcome at action time
We also tested for regions encoding out-
come information at the time of action
performance. For this we used a time-
span analysis to train the classifier on out-
come representations at the time of
outcome delivery, and then tested at the
time of action execution.We found signif-
icant signals in dlPFC (p 0.05 SVFWE,
t(18)  5.15, x  51, y  17, z  37),
vmPFC (p  0.05 SVFWE, t(18)  6.02,
x 0, y 53, z20), central OFC (p
0.05 SVFWE, t(18) 5.15, x 30, y 38,
z11), and caudate (p 0.05 SVFWE,
t(18) 4.02, x 9, y 20, z 16).
Action at stimulus time
We also expected regions involved in
goal-directed control to encode action in-
formation at the time of initial stimulus
presentation. Out of the regions identified
above as containing outcome information
at the time of either initial stimulus pre-
sentation or action execution, two regions
also contained action information at the
initial stimulus time: the dlPFC (p 0.05 SVFWE, x 57, y 8,
z 34, t(18) 3.85) and vmPFC (p 0.05 SVFWE, x 0, y 53,
z20, t(18) 6.02).
Regions containing both action and outcome information at
stimulus time
To formally identify voxels containing both outcome and action
information at the time of the initial stimulus, we performed a
conjunction analysis on the results of the outcome at stimulus
time and action at stimulus time statistical maps. This analysis
yielded significant effects only in right dlPFC (conjunction:
p  0.05 SVFWE, x  60, y  17, z  34, t(18)  3.47; Fig. 3A).
Although we did not specify the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC) as an a priori region of interest, activity was also found
in this region at an uncorrected threshold. Given that this region
was identified as being involved inmodel-based RL algorithms in
a previous study (Lee et al., 2014), we performed a post hoc small
volume correction using dmPFC coordinates identified in that
study (x 12, y 32, z 37), which revealed a significant cluster
(p 0.05 SVFWE, x 21, y 35, z 40, t(18) 3.36). As this
was a post hoc inference, we refrain from discussing it further, but
report it for completeness.
Regions containing both action at stimulus time and outcome at
action execution
We also performed a conjunction analysis to pinpoint regions in
which action information is available at the initial stimulus time,
while outcome information is represented during action execu-
tion. This contrast revealed significant effects in the vmPFC (p
0.05 SVFWE, x 3, y 53, z20, t(18) 5.54), as well as the
left (p 0.05 SVFWE, x42, y 26, z 49, t(18) 4.78) and
right (p  0.05 SVFWE, x  51, y  29, z  43, t(18)  3.97)
dlPFC (Fig. 3B).
Habitual encoding of stimulus–response
associations
To identify brain regions that could potentially be involved in
habitual action selection, we tested for areas that encoded action
information at the initial stimulus time but that were not encod-
ing outcome information at either the stimulus time or during
action performance. Of the areas identified in the analysis testing
for significant decoding of actions at the time of stimulus, two
regions in particular were identified as containing action repre-
sentations that did not also contain outcome representations: the
posterior lateral putamen (p 0.05 SVFWE, x27, y22,
z 7, t(18) 3.24; peak within same cluster x21, y19,
z  7, t(18)  4.79), and the supplementary motor cortex (p 
0.05 FWE, x 15, y 32, z 61, t(18) 7.95). In an independent
follow-up analysis using anatomically defined regions of interest
centered on the posterior putamen and supplementary motor
cortex, we tested whether these regions contained on average
significantly better predictions of actions compared with out-
comes at the time of stimulus. In a paired t test we found that
action representations were significantly more strongly repre-
sented than outcome representations in both these regions (Fig.
4; putamen: p 0.001, t(18) 3.9; supplementary model cortex:
p  0.005, t(18)  2.86). In addition to these paired t tests, we
performed one-sample t tests against a random-chance accuracy
score, which indicated that only action information, but not out-
come information, was present in the putamen and supplemen-
tary model cortex at the time of the initial stimulus presentation.
If putamen is driving motor activity during the performance
A B
C D
Figure 3. Goal-directed representations. A, Right dlPFC encoded both action and outcome representations at the time of the
initial stimulus presentation (conjunction analysis, x 60, y 17, z 34, t(18) 3.47).B, vmPFC encoded action at the time of
initial stimulus presentation and outcome information at the time of action performance (conjunction, x 3, y 53, z20,
t(18) 5.54). C, Bar plot depicts accuracy score distributions in an independently defined dlPFC ROI. This score is the decoding
accuracy minus 0.5, which is the expected accuracy of a random algorithm, *p 0.05, **p 0.005. D, Bar plot depicts accuracy
score distributions for vmPFC, ***p 0.0005.
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of habitual actions, one would expect this area to be functionally
connected to thalamus, and the thalamus in turn tomotor cortex
in the contralateral (left) hemisphere, as dictated by the anatomy
of corticostriatal loops. We tested for psychophysiological inter-
actions (PPI) between an indicator variable for the onset of the
initial stimulus and neural activity seeded at putamen and thala-
mus. The putamen-based PPI resulted in a significant correlation
with activity in the left thalamus (p 0.05 SVFWE, x12, y
19, z  2, t(18)  4.07) and the thalamus PPI correlated
significantly with activity in left premotor cortex (p  0.05
SVFWE, x39, y7, z 46, t(18) 7.39). A weaker effect
was also found in the ipsilateral (right) premotor cortex (p 0.05
SVFWE, x 42, y10, z 58, t(18) 5.45). All seed coordi-
nates used in the PPI were defined independently of results of the
other analyses in this study (see Table 2).
Integrated stimulus-action representations
We also tested for integrated stimulus-action representations—
encoding specific stimulus-action pairs as unique configurations
(e.g., S1A1) rather than encoding actions independently of their
antecedent stimulus—at the time of the initial stimulus (see Ma-
terials andMethods). Integrated stimulus-action representations
were identified (Fig. 5) in the anterior dorsomedial striatum
(caudate nucleus; p 0.05 SVFWE, x 15, y 11, z 22, t(18)
4.16) and hippocampus (p 0.05 SVFWE, x 24, y1, z
20, t(18) 4.35).
Integrated action-outcome representation
We also tested for evidence of integrated action-outcome repre-
sentations at the time of stimulus, using a similar approach. No
significant decoding of integrated action-outcome representa-
tions was found.
Ruling out response time confounds
There was a significant difference in response times for the two
actions (two-sided paired t test, t(18)  3.415, p  0.003); in
contrast, no differencewas found in response times as function of
the identity of the initial stimulus (t(18)  0.561, p  0.582) or
outcome state (two-sided paired t test, t(18) 0.577, p 0.571).
To ensure that response times were not confounding our results,
we ran additional analyses assessing action-dependent decoding.
Specifically, in these analyses, we included individual trial reac-
tion times as a covariate of no-interest in the fMRI design matrix
and re-ran all of the classification analyses involving actions as
described above. We filtered out any variance in voxel activity
explained by trial-by-trial response times at the initial stimulus
and action execution time points. This was accomplished by es-
timating a GLM, which included trial-by-trial reaction times as
parametric modulators, time locked to the initial stimulus and
action execution trial events. Following GLM estimation, -values
for these parametric modulators were multiplied by the corre-
sponding regressors and linearly subtracted from the data. All of
our results remained significant after inclusion of the reaction
time covariate, indicating that our classifier is not relying on
differences in reaction times to decode action information.
Discussion
Contemporary associative theory distinguishes between habitual
S-R associations and a combination of S-O, O-R, and R-O asso-
ciations thought to mediate goal-directed performance (Balleine
and Ostlund, 2007). In this study, we used multivariate pattern
analysis to assess whether dissociable regions of the human brain
encode these distinct associative structures. Unlike previous
work in humans, contrasting qualitatively different experimental
conditions designed to encourage different action-selection strat-
egies, or comparing largely parameter-driven value signals gen-
erated by RL algorithms, our approach sought to identify a neural
implementation of the associative content of goal-directed versus
habitual behavioral control. We found evidence for stimulus-
elicited response representations but no outcome representa-
tions, indicative of habits, in the DLS (posterior putamen).
Conversely, in the vmPFC, dlPFC, and anterior caudate nucleus,
both response and outcome representations were present, indic-
ative of goal-directed decision making.
Our finding of stimulus-elicited response, but not outcome, rep-
resentations in the DLS suggests that this area is especially involved
in encoding S-R associations. While previous studies have found
evidence that activity in this area increases over time as habits come
to control behavior (Tricomi et al., 2009), and that activity in this
region correlates with model-free value signals (Wunderlich et al.,
2012; Lee et al., 2014), the present study illuminates the associations
encoded in the region. A previous report found that the degree of
structural connectivity between the posterior putamen and the pre-
motor cortex predicts susceptibility to habit-like “slips-of-action”
(de Wit et al., 2012). Our connectivity analysis suggests a potential
mechanismbywhich stimulus—response-related activity in the pu-
tamen—is ultimately transferred to the motor cortex via the thala-
mus, to implement habitual motor control.
Whereas habits depend on a reflexive retrieval of a previously
reinforced response, goal-directed behavior involves selecting,
A
B
Figure 4. Habitual representations. A, A region of DLS (posterior putamen), extending into
the globus pallidus (GP) was found to encode information about the action to be performed at
the timeof initial stimulus presentation ( p 0.05 SVFWE, x27, y22, z 7, t(18)
3.24), but critically, no significant information about outcome. B, The distribution of accuracy
scores for actions and outcomes at the time of initial stimulus in an independently defined
putamen/GP region of interest, ***p 0.0005.
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evaluating, and initiating an action based
on the probability and utility of its conse-
quences. The “associative cybernetics the-
ory” (Balleine and Ostlund, 2007; de Wit
and Dickinson, 2009) postulates that the
retrieval of potential outcomes, of the ac-
tions that produce them, and of the values
of those actions, is mediated respectively
by S-O, O-R, and R-O associations.
Critically, to allow for sensitivity to
sensory-specific outcome devaluation
and contingency degradation, defining
features of goal-directed performance, the
associations relating the probabilities and
utilities of potential outcomes to the stim-
uli and actions that produce themmust be
flexible and current, suggesting a dynamic
binding of features.
One area well suited for the dynamic binding of stimuli, ac-
tions, and outcomes is the dlPFC, given prior evidence for a role
of this structure in working-memory and goal-directed behavior
more generally (Goldman-Rakic, 1996;Miller and Cohen, 2001).
We found that activity in this region reflected representations of
both action and outcome identities at the time of initial stimulus
presentation, indicative of a key role for this region in encoding
the information necessary to guide goal-directed actions at the
time of decision making. Specifically, the finding that dlPFC ac-
tivity reflects information about action and outcome identities,
necessary for computing goal-directed action values, is consistent
with a contribution of this area to encoding the model compo-
nent of a model-based RL algorithm. Previous findings reported
state-prediction errors in this region that could underpin learn-
ing of the underlying associations needed to form such a model
(Gla¨scher et al., 2010). The present findings suggest that dlPFC is
involved in learning or updating such amodel as well as encoding
(or at least retrieving) the model itself.
The contribution of dlPFC to the encoding of associative in-
formation necessary for computing goal-directed actions at the
time of initial stimulus presentation can be contrasted with our
findings in the vmPFC.Whereas vmPFC did encode information
about the action at the time of initial stimulus presentation, in-
formation about the outcome identity was not present until later
in the trial, during action execution. However, in the central
orbitofrontal cortex (cOFC), an area adjacent to and highly con-
nected to the vmPFC (Carmichael and Price, 1996), we did find
that outcome identity information was represented at the time of
initial stimulus presentation. One possibility, therefore, is that
the cOFC encodes the identity of a goal at the time of initial
decisionmaking and that this outcome-identity representation is
then used to retrieve outcome value signals in the vmPFC. Con-
sistent with this interpretation, a previous study by our group
reported activity in cOFC extending to vmPFC correlating with
the categorical identity of the goal at the time of decision making
(McNamee et al., 2013). In that previous study, information
about the value of the goal was most prominently represented in
vmPFC. An important feature of our experiment is that we have
controlled for value (i.e., kept value constant throughout, with
high and low value outcomes assigned equally often to every
possible combination of stimuli and actions), to ensure that out-
come identity information is not confounded with the outcome
value. Thus, we cannot test in the present design when value infor-
mation about outcomes emerges in vmPFC. However, previous
studies have reported such information to be present in both the
vmPFCand in the dlPFCat the timeof decisionmaking (Plassmann
et al., 2007; Chib et al., 2009).
Our findings provide new insight into the differential func-
tions of DLS versus DMS. While the posterior DLS (posterior
putamen) was found to encode representations of responses elic-
ited by discriminative stimuli, a different type of stimulus–re-
sponse coding was present in the anterior dorsomedial striatum
(anterior caudate), as well as in the hippocampus, such that the
encoding of response associations was integrated with stimulus
identity: a unique distributed representation was present in these
areas for each stimulus–response pair. In contrast, in the DLS,
each response was coded independently of the stimulus that elic-
ited it. The binding of stimulus–response associations into a sin-
gle representation found in the DMS and hippocampus could
underpin a form of abstraction of stimulus–response codes,
which could potentially be part of a mechanism for chunking
stimulus–response configurations. The hippocampus in particu-
lar has been proposed to support the unitization, or chunking, of
stimulus elements into unique configurations (Sutherland and
Rudy, 1989). Our results suggest that the DMS may also play an
important role in this process. Our finding of a difference in the
typeof responsecodingpresent in theDMSversusDLS is important,
given that some previous neurophysiology studies have not found
clear differences in information encoding between these regions
(Kim et al., 2009; Kimchi et al., 2009; Stalnaker et al., 2010).
Our results also differentiate between the DLS and DMS in
that only the DMS was found to encode outcome identity. An
important feature of our experimental design is that differences
found in outcome identity representations between these regions
could not be accounted for by potential differences in the value of
the outcomes. While we did have actions leading to high versus
low rewards in our experiment, we trained the classifier to distin-
guish between different outcome states leading to the same high-
valued reward. This is necessary because, differences in outcome
value, i.e., between high- and low-valued goal states, could drive
differences in outcome-related neural activity in a brain region even
if that area is not explicitly representing outcome identity: indeed,
even a pure S-R learning systemwould discriminate high- and low-
valued states as thehigh-valued statewouldbeassociatedwith stron-
ger S-R associations through trial-by-trial reinforcement.
Naturally, the absence of significant decoding from the BOLD
signal in a given brain area does not imply the absence of that
information at the level of single neurons. fMRI and single-unit
data may capture different aspects of neural activity in any event,
with the BOLD signal suggested to be correlated more closely
x = 18 y = 17
Figure 5. Integrated stimulus-action representations were localized in DMS (anterior caudate nucleus; p 0.05 SVFWE, x
15, y 11, z 22, t(18) 4.16) and hippocampus ( p 0.05 SVFWE, x 24, y1, z20, t(18) 4.35).
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with input into a region and intrinsic processing therein as op-
posed to output (Logothetis et al., 2001). Nevertheless, it is strik-
ing that our current findings about information content do
accord verywell with previous evidence about the differential role
of dorsolateral striatum in habitual control, and a corresponding
role for dorsomedial striatum and prefrontal cortex regions in
goal-directed actions (Hikosaka et al., 1989; Yin et al., 2004, 2005;
Valentin et al., 2007; Gla¨scher et al., 2010).
To conclude, our present results suggest that different brain
areas are involved in encoding different kinds of information
about responses and outcomes, consistent with a differential role
for these regions in goal-directed and habitual learning and con-
trol. Whereas cortical areas including the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex alongside the an-
terior dorsomedial striatum contained associative information
about the identities of both responses and outcomes, necessary
for goal-directed control, the dorsolateral striatum contained
only information about stimuli and responses, which would be
sufficient for habitual but not goal-directed control.
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